Saturday, June 25, 2016

Syrian Offensive to Retake Raqqa Ends in Abysmal Failure

SAA T-90 in the Raqqa countryside
On 2 June 2016, the Syrian Arab Army and its allies launched an offensive to capture the capital of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS/ISIL/IS, henceforth Daesh), the city of Raqqa, Syria. After nearly three weeks of fighting, Syrian government forces first advanced to within 7 km of Tabqa Air Base, south of Raqqa. Then, in a series of counterattacks, Daesh managed to rout the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies, pushing them into full-scale retreat and overrunning their positions in the process. The following is that story in as much detail as is possible at the current moment. The following list shows the units aligned with the Syrian regime in the offensive.

Syrian Arab Republic and Allies 

  •  Syrian Armed Forces
    •  Syrian Arab Army 
      •  Republican Guard
        • 103rd Brigade (Syrian Marines) 
      •  Suqur al-Sahara (Desert Hawks Brigade) 
      • Tiger Forces 
      •  4th Armored Division
        • 555th Special Forces Regiment 
        • 154th Artillery Regiment 
        • Unknown Other Components 
      •  10th Mechanized Division 
        • Unknown Components 
    •  National Defense Force 
      • Golan Regiment 
    •  Syrian Arab Air Force 
  • Allied Militias 
    •  Ba'ath Brigades 
    •  Galilee Forces 
    •  Arab Nationalist Guard 
    •  Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
  •  Russian Armed Forces 
    •  Russian Aerospace Forces 
    •  Russian Special Operations Forces 

SAA T-62 advancing through the Raqqa countryside, early June 2016
Opposing them were both local and foreign fighters from Daesh, including elements of their special forces units. The Syrian forces, which kicked off the offensive on the 2nd of June, initially found themselves approximately 120 km from the city of Raqqa, but by the end of the first day had already advanced nearly 20 km and captured some small settlements near the edge of the Hama Governorate. Within two days of these gains, the SAA and its allies had advanced to within 47 km of the strategic Tabqa Air Base, former home of the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF)'s 12 Squadron (MiG-21MF/UM) and 24 Brigade (Mi-8). They also entered Ar-Raqqah (Raqqa) Governorate for the first time since their retreat in 2014, and finally captured the small town of Abu Allaj before settling down to wait out a sand storm, which blew in on the morning of the 4th. Under the cover of the sand storm, Daesh counterattacked SAA positions, causing the SAA to retreat and temporarily cede land back to the extremists. By the 6th the regime forces had advanced to within 24 km of Tabqa Air Base and were engaged in heavy fighting near the al-Rasafeh crossroads.

SAA-allied fighters travelling to the front lines of the offensive in an improvised armored pickup truck

SAA equipment being trucked to the front line near Raqqa


Throughout the engagement at al-Rasafeh crossroads, Daesh repeatedly launched counterattacks into the rear areas of the SAA salient, near Ithriyah. These attacks were reportedly repulsed. Control of the al-Rasafeh crossroads is uncertain between the 7th and the 11th, but what is known is that by the 11th the SAA had secured the crossroads enough for Daesh to send a series of five suicide bombers (teenagers) to attack the SAA positions. Four of the five (all of whom were members of the so-called Caliphate Cubs)  managed to detonate their vests, killing about 15 soldiers, while the fifth was captured and found to be only 13 years old. At the same time, the SAA had advanced to within "a few" kilometers of Tabqa Air Base and were awaiting reinforcements before storming the base itself. It was here that the offensive began to stall.



The SAA forces were held back about 15 km from the base for over a week, Receiving reinforcements and more air support from the Russian Air Force (RuAF) and the SyAAF, the SAA and its allies pushed toward the base in earnest once more on the 19th of June. At first things seemed to be going well; Daesh was pushed within 7 km of the base, and the Thawra oil field (located near the base fell to the SAA (only to be recaptured by Daesh, then recaptured again by the SAA within 24 hours). However, starting with a fresh counterattack on the 20th, Daesh managed to recapture both the Thawra oil field and the more southerly Sfaiyeh oil field. More and more reinforcements poured into the whole that had been blown in the SAA's lines, and Daesh fighters rapidly advanced down the road toward the al-Rasafeh crossroads and Highway 42. The crossroads fell within a matter of hours, and by nightfall Daesh was within artillery striking range of the SAA in Albu Allaj.

SAA tank knocked out of action near Raqqa 


Late on 20 June the SAA and its allies began a chaotic, rapid retreat. Weapons were thrown down, tents left standing, vehicles abandoned, and important documents left to be captured. During the retreat, Daesh managed to overrun the retreating SAA forces, inflicting heavy casualties upon them. By the 22nd of June they had retreated to the border of the Governorate, thus ending the offensive. During the hasty retreat, the chief-of-staff of the 10th Mechanized Division, Major General Hassan Saado, was killed by enemy action. All-told, between 40-100 soldiers have been acknowledged as dead, although those numbers may in fact be much higher. According to some reports, the Syrian Marines and the Tiger Force abandoned their comrades in the 555th Special Forces Regiment, leaving some regime sympathizers to begin denying the existence of the 555th altogether.

Perhaps the same vehicle we saw earlier transporting SAA/allied troops to the front
Abandoned SAA tents

The defeat comes as the SAA is in the midst of a large-scale operation in Aleppo while the Kurdish YPG and American-backed SDF push against Daesh in Raqqa and Manbij. Instead of acknowledging the shortcomings of the SAA and coming to terms with the fact that they may not be the reinvigorated fighting force Russian propaganda makes them out to be, regime apologists have begun blaming a lack of proper Russian air support for the failure. This comes despite evidence to the contrary, and simply stinks of an attempt to save face.

Wednesday, June 8, 2016

International Solidarity: The Case for Supporting Rojava, Part 4

International Solidarity: The Case for Supporting Rojava, Part 4



Flags of the Syrian government, Rojava/Federation of Northern Syria, the Syrian opposition, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

(Continued from Parts 12, and 3)

Over five years ago an uprising in Dara’a, Southern Syria, set into motion the events that would eventually culminate in the multi-front Syrian Civil War we see today. Throughout the conflict one group in particular has stuck to its principles of self-defense, gender equality, democratic leadership and environmental protectionism. This group, the Kurds of Northern Syria (Henceforth Rojava), have taken advantage of the chaos in their country to push for more autonomy and, perhaps, an independent state. My purpose is to convince the reader that increased support of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) would be beneficial to regional and international goals and thus should be continued and increased. My bias is therefore apparent and must be taken into account. Throughout this post there will be sources linking to YouTube videos; use this to “watch” the Rojava Revolution from beginning to its current state. In the midst of the horror that is the Syrian Civil War there is a single shining glimmer of hope; Rojava, currently engaged in a war for survival and independence whilst simultaneously engaging in a political experiment the likes of which has never been seen before.


Iraqi military Humvee captured by Daesh and converted into a VBIED. The vehicle was captured by the YBŞ outside Shingal, Iraq. 

Daesh is adept at using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), in layman’s terms a car full of bombs driven by a suicidal fighter toward enemy lines. Their humble beginnings were red-and-white Nissan sedans with trunks full of old artillery shells driven at American forces in Iraq during the occupation of that country which began in 2003. More contemporary Daesh VBIEDs feature heavy armor plating, making it nearly impossible to stop them with anything short of an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM), a tank, or an airstrike. Again, as previously stated, Daesh had in their inventory a wide variety of armored vehicles. However, it is important to note that these vehicles do not equate an effective mechanized force on their own. Modern weapons of war require extensive maintenance, repair, and resources. Thus, as many captured tanks and armored personnel carriers ran out of ammunition, they were filled with explosives and driven at YPG lines. Armored recovery vehicles and ambulances were also used in the assaults, along with a plethora of homemade vehicles, from armored garbage trucks to pickup trucks sporting massive anti-aircraft guns. However, perhaps one of the deadliest and most feared weapons on the Daesh inventory is none other than the armored bulldozer. In an interview between the author and an Iraqi Peshmerga member, the details of these vehicles was fully revealed. Essentially a standard bulldozer (or a military bulldozer in some cases) is taken and up-armored with steel plating around vital areas. Then, in some cases, the vehicle is also given concrete reinforcement. Finally it is packed with explosives and sent chugging toward enemy lines. Often ATGMs and tank shells fail to destroy the improvised bulldozers, leaving only airstrikes to prevent them from wreaking havoc on Kurdish lines.

Mad Max meets hell: Daesh armored bulldozer

VBIEDs are used in conjunction with other armored vehicles and infantry waves to overwhelm and shock defenders. Often two or three VBIEDs will be used in quick succession, eliminating layers of defenses and allowing Daesh fighters to infiltrate behind Kurdish defenses. After Daesh began massacring Yazidi civilians in Shingal, Iraq, the United States, as previously mentioned, began bombing the terrorist group on behalf of Baghdad. In late September 2014, that focus shifted to include Syria as well, and on 27 September the first airstrike was carried out by an American F-15E near Kobanê, targeting a Daesh building and two armored vehicles (possibly VBIEDs).

American F-15 is refueled over Syria en-route to strike Daesh targets

Despite the airstrikes, Daesh continued to shell the city. The following day, 28 September, over 1,500 Kurdish fighters arrived from Turkey to join the fight.  As October arrived, soldiers inside Kobanê proper began preparing for increased urban combat as the fighting came closer and closer to the city center. Sandbag emplacements were installed and heavily defended, but in the end a lack of ammunition and heavy weaponry led the YPG to retreat from outlying city positions. As YPG forces retreated, Daesh moved in and immediately began embarking on a campaign of ethnic cleansing, torture, and crimes against humanity. Thousands crowded the Turkish border crossing, where Turkish troops were deployed but not ordered to intervene. Stories of children having their hearts cut out of their chests and elderly persons being brutally beaten and murdered spread like wildfire, adding to the panic at the border. Captured fighters, particularly women of the YPJ, were beaten, often raped, and beheaded. The true brutality of Daesh really came out in their campaign against Kobanê and reminded the Kurds what they were fighting for.

Airstrike in Kobanê
The use of suicide bombers was not unique to Daesh. In rare desperation, a Kurdish woman was used as a suicide bomber against IS positions, killing at least a dozen. Nine days into October and the YPG was running low on ammunition and other supplies. Outnumbered and outgunned, the situation looked dire as Daesh fighters began setting fire to Kobanê to create a smoke screen designed to thwart the prying eyes of the Coalition. Quick to adapt, Daesh began dressing fighters up in YPG uniforms, flying YPG flags from their motorcycles (which they began using to ferry ammunition around the city), and driving tanks into the city under the cover of smoke and darkness. 40% of Kobanê was captured by 10 October. By the 15th of October the fighting had spread to the Turkish/Syrian border crossing, which Daesh assaulted at least four times. Over the course of four days (between the 13th and the 17th) the coalition launched over 53 airstrikes against Daesh in and around Kobanê alone. On the 19th, the first Coalition airdrops of supplies to YPG forces took place, with supplies coming from Iraqi Kurdistan as well as Coalition countries.

Turkish tanks and civilians watch the battle from the safety of the Turkish side of the border 

In early September a joint-operations room had been founded, comprising of the YPG/YPJ and elements of the FSA. This coalition, known as Euphrates Volcano, was announced on 10 September 2014. Euphrates Volcano is comprised of the following groups, along with the YPG and the YPJ: the Islamic Front (Aleppo Division), Tawhid Brigade (Northern Sector), Jaysh al-Thuwar, Jabhat al-Akrad, Kita’ib Shams al-Shamal, Liwa Thuwar ar-Raqqa, Liwa al-Jihad fi Sabeel Allah, Saraya Jarablus, Tahrir Brigade, Jaysh al-Qasas, and Liwa Amna ar-Raqqa. On 29 October, FSA fighters began arriving via Turkey, the first time Turkey had allowed non-Syrian Kurds to cross the border to fight. In addition to FSA reinforcements, comrades from Iraqi Kurdistan began crossing the border with Syria (of which they had controlled the northern section of for about a month) and arriving via Turkey, bringing with them much-needed heavy equipment.


YPG T-54/55 and an MT-LB


As more Kurdish defenders streamed into the city, the once-thriving Kobanê turned into a meatgrinder. Daesh began pulling forces from other areas of Syria and throwing them into the offensive, desperate not to let their assault die out. By November the situation had reached its worst point, with 60% of the city under Daesh control. The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) began sending more fighters and equipment across the border to bolster Syrian Kurdish forces, and by the end of November the tides had begun to turn. Coalition airstrikes, along with reinforcements and resupply, bloodied the nose of Daesh, who stubbornly refused to back down from the confrontation. To some this inability to throw in the towel, so to speak, was surprising. To others it was absolutely expected.

A man in the remains of Kobanê

Daesh was formed partially by former Iraqi Ba’ath party members, many of whom were in the Iraqi military. The Iraqi military, while historically decent at logistics and supply operations, suffered when it came to tactical battlefield decision making. During their numerous wars with Israel, Iraqi forces often brought more than enough equipment, ammunition and fuel, but junior officers failed their troops. Furthermore, as evidenced at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi generals lacked originality and would refuse to guard their flanks. Forces were sent into enemy territory with no reconnaissance done, with no flank guards, and while they did well when facing an enemy head-on (and the Iranians did suffer in early head-on battles), simply maneuvering to the sides of the massed Iraqi armor would allow Iranian forces to attack the weaker parts of the armored columns, routing them time and again. When frustrated by a lack of action, Iraqi forces under Saddam Hussein would launch large-scale chemical weapons attacks against the masses of Iranian infantry, who were lightly armed and poorly trained. This tactic would rear its ugly head several more times before Saddam was ultimately removed from power.

A fighter atop a building in Kobanê

 Again during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent action against American and Coalition forces, while some Iraqi soldiers fought tenaciously and bravely, the majority were routed simply due to a lack of military intelligence and combined arms abilities. After the war, Shia and Kurdish minorities in the south and north of Iraq (respectively) rose up at the urging of the US, only to be brutally put down by Saddam’s security forces. This was hardly the first time the Iraqi military had been used against the Kurds; the Iraqi government and Kurdish citizens had battled several times throughout the short history of the Mesopotamian nation-state. Thus, animosity among Saddam’s men toward the Kurds was widespread, especially among military officers.

Destroyed Iraqi government tank in the streets of Basra

During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, loyalist forces under President Hussein often fought to the bitter end; the Fedayeen Saddam, created after the first Gulf War to help bolster the Iraqi regime against internal threats, along with some members of the Republican Guard, stood against nearly impossible odds and fought the Coalition invaders, dying in their thousands while doing next-to-nothing for the war effort itself. These tactics can still be seen in use against forces like the YPG today.
As reinforcements and supplies continued to come in from abroad, Daesh went on the defensive. Several attempted advances were halted with air support and the extremist forces were pushed back. By the end of December, Daesh was barely holding onto the city, and a series of rapid advances in early January proved to be the final blow against the organization in Kobanê. On January 26th, the YPG announced the liberation of Kobanê and the beginning of their clean-up operations in the town.

And boy do they have their work cut out for them

As Kobanê proved, local Kurdish and allied forces, supported by American and Coalition airstrikes could prove absolutely lethal to Daesh. September - October 2014’s airstrikes alone totalled the following:

  • September 2014 -- Building (1); Armed Vehicle (3); Artillery (1); Tank (1);
  • October 2014 -- Checkpoint (2);  Fighting Position (6); Armed Vehicle (33); Tank (3); Other (59); Artillery (2); Supply Depot (1); Building (30)
  • November 2014 -- Other (100); Armed Vehicle (8); Building (6);

In those three months alone (and September barely counts), it is clear to see the impact the coalition made on Daesh’s operational capabilities. The strikes target a wide variety of targets beyond VBIEDs as mentioned earlier, including buildings, machine gun nests, sniper positions, training centers, artillery positions, fighting positions, checkpoints, and other military infrastructure. Continuation of these strikes, with an emphasis on limited or eliminating altogether civilian casualties, is a must for the United States and the global coalition (CJTF-OIR). Without continued air support, the tides could just as easily shift against the YPG and back into the hands of Daesh. As recently as May 2016 Daesh has been on the offensive, showing their ability to gain ground is still intact.

Airstrike outside Kobanê

In a move heavily supported politically by the United States, on 10 October 2015 a new organization was founded in Northern Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF. The SDF is comprised of, on top of the YPJ/YPG, the following groups: The Syrian Arab Coalition, members of the Shammer tribal militias, the Al-Sanadid Forces, the former Euphrates Volcano, Army of Revolutionaries, the Northern Sun Battalion, the Martyrs of Dam Brigade, Liwa Jund Al Haramayn, Martyr Kaseem Al Areef Battalion, Jabhat al-Akrad, Seljuq Brigade, Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa, Jaish al-Salam, Furat Jarablus, New Syrian Forces, Liwai 99 Musat, Brigade Groups of Al-Jazira, Euphrates Martyr’s Battalion, Free Jarabulus Battalion, Liwa Ahrar al-Raqqah, A-lShaitat tribal militia members,Liwaa Siqur El-Badiye, Manbij Turkmen Brigade, the Syriac Union Party, the Syriac Military Council, and Sutoro.

Flag of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 

Through air strikes, the Western powers can show their political and military support of Rojava and express their will to support Kurdish self-determination. One of the deciding factors in any military intervention should without a doubt be the thought of political repercussions; that is to say, if the Russians oppose supporting a group of fighters, supporting them anyway hurts relations with Russia. In the case of the PYD (And via them the YPG/YPJ), there is no real danger of hurting relations with Russia. In fact, the only real negative side to said support would be relations with Turkey. Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and is thus a close American ally. As the YPG is a sister organization of the PKK, it can be seen as supporting the PKK to support the YPG.
In order to secure Turkish support for such a venture, the United States would need to either (1) find a way to guarantee materials will not end up in the hands of the PKK, (2) provide only air support and no ground support, or (3) refuse to support Rojava altogether. Anti-tank missile systems, such as the BGM-71 TOW, would help the YPG combat Daesh’s heavy equipment, but would also allow the PKK to destroy Turkish tanks in combat. In an attempt to circumvent this issue, the United States could provide advanced defensive systems to Turkey for use on tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, technology from the currently-deployed US M1A2SEP2 Abrams main battle tank which could easily be converted to Turkey’s extensive fleet of Leopard I and M60 main battle tanks. Turkey’s own domestic tank, the Altay, could be supplemented with advanced technology, making it nearly invulnerable to most BGM-71 TOW systems (older ones, at least).

BGM-71 TOW 

Recently the Iraqi military embarked on a campaign to liberate the al-Rutbah area of western Iraq. In the attacks the Iraqi military used extensive close air support and flanking tactics, tactics the Iraqi military previously was unable to pull off. As the war has progressed in Iraq and Syria, repeatedly it has been proven that when faced with a competent military utilizing close air support, Daesh can be defeated. This was evidenced recently at al-Rutbah and Ramadi in Iraq, and Palmyra in Syria. The SDF provides a vessel through which American and coalition influence can be exerted via air strikes and supply drops, along with embedded trainers.

The Iraqi flag hoisted above Ramadi

A major part of US efforts, however, will need to be political and diplomatic. In order to properly carry out attacks in Syria, the US must secure peace between the PKK and the Turkish government. This must be done or any efforts will be in vain as Kurdish forces loyal to the PKK may trickle back into Turkey, prompting a Turkish invasion of Rojava. Real, solid negotiations are required and much political maneuvering must be achieved. It will take a skillful set of politicians in the US to accomplish this, making the upcoming election even more important.
Furthermore, negotiations between Rojava and the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq must be worked out. The two sides are at least amicable at the current time, but it is anybody’s guess as to how long that will last.

Two weapons next to a child's toy in Kobanê

In closing, it is important to bear in mind the key role airstrikes and supply drops have had on the battlefield. Without them, Kobanê surely would have fallen. If the coalition is to see success in the upcoming (currently-underway as of this writing) operation to retake Raqqa, they will surely need to continue supporting local forces such as the SDF and in particular the YPG. This means more heavy weaponry, medical supplies, and other forms of equipment on top of continuing airstrikes in the region. For these purposes it is recommended to deploy a carrier battle group or additional USAF assets to the region. However, the impetus must be on reducing and eliminating civilian casualties, similar to the NATO campaign in Libya. Surplus armored bulldozers should be delivered to the SDF, along with anti-mine equipment and the training on how to use the advanced equipment. A possible (unlikely) scenario would see US and Russian military sappers working side-by-side in Syria behind the SDF, clearing IEDs from the countryside as the Kurdish and allied forces advance.

Russian sappers near Palmyra
The potential for a stable, democratic and popularly-supported Rojava is real. The world needs to recognize this opportunity at a unique political experiment, a federal system which may prove to be the foundation for solving other issues (such as Israel/Palestine, Morocco/Western Sahara, etc.). In order to allow this system to develop, the world must also stand in support of the local forces in the area and provide them with the equipment, training and military support necessary to defeat Daesh and protect the Kurdish lands.

As of this writing, the following is taking place: Twin offensives in Iraq against Mosul and Fallujah, and twin offensives in Syria against Manbij and Raqqa. Raqqa is being assaulted from both the north (by the SDF) and the south (by the SAA). These battles will be decided in the coming weeks and months.


(Most photos courtesy Reuters)


Sunday, June 5, 2016

International Solidarity: The Case for Supporting Rojava, Part 3

International Solidarity: The Case for Supporting Rojava, Part 3



Flags of the Syrian government, Rojava/Federation of Northern Syria, the Syrian opposition, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

(Continued from Parts 1 and 2)

Over five years ago an uprising in Dara’a, Southern Syria, set into motion the events that would eventually culminate in the multi-front Syrian Civil War we see today. Throughout the conflict one group in particular has stuck to its principles of self-defense, gender equality, democratic leadership and environmental protectionism. This group, the Kurds of Northern Syria (Henceforth Rojava), have taken advantage of the chaos in their country to push for more autonomy and, perhaps, an independent state. My purpose is to convince the reader that increased support of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) would be beneficial to regional and international goals and thus should be continued and increased. My bias is therefore apparent and must be taken into account. Throughout this post there will be sources linking to YouTube videos; use this to “watch” the Rojava Revolution from beginning to its current state. In the midst of the horror that is the Syrian Civil War there is a single shining glimmer of hope; Rojava, currently engaged in a war for survival and independence whilst simultaneously engaging in a political experiment the likes of which has never been seen before.

Slightly nauseating photograph of a British Royal Air Force (RAF) Panavia Tornado over Syria

The Coalition refers to a broad collection of nations providing different levels of support to the various factions in the wars in Syria and Iraq. In Syria, military support for Rojava comes from the United States, Australia, France, the Netherlands, Jordan, Morocco, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (and formerly Canada). These nations make up Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, otherwise known as CJTF-OIR. Additional military aid is provided by Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Canada, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait ,Lebanon, Spain and Singapore, along with other unnamed Eastern European and Middle Eastern nations.

A US Navy F/A-18 refueling a French Navy Dassault Super Etendard, escorted by one French Navy Dassault Rafale 

Unfortunately for Rojava, these airstrikes would largely only begin after the city of Kobanê was nearly overrun by Daesh. Prior to this, the Rojava conflict was largely unknown to Westerners, but the actual clashing with outside forces began for Rojava all the way back in 2011, shortly after the aforementioned protests took place. There were reports on 16 March 2011 of clashes in Al-Hasakah between government forces and local protesters. The early morning of 23 March 2011 saw bloodshed in the southern city of Dara’a, with 15 or 16 protesters being killed by police and military officials. The 31st saw great promise for the Kurds; initially, President Assad offered to investigate the loss of Syrian citizenship by 150,000 Kurds in Al-Hasakah under his father Hafez al-Assad, an attempt to placate the Kurds and keep them from joining the rebellion. As April began, chaos began to spread to certain parts of Syria. Unknown gunmen began firing on protesters. On 7 April President Assad granted citizenship to 220,000 Kurds who had been stripped of their nationality in the 1960s (along with their children) in a further attempt to calm the Kurdish people and prevent them from joining the revolution. April 22nd became a rallying call for many around the nation, with mass protests resulting in at least 100 deaths. April 25 saw the beginning of the siege of Dara’a, which ended with several hundred civilians killed. The siege saw some of the first widespread use of military against civilians, including at least 20 tanks. This resulted in solidarity protests in many Syrian cities on the following friday, April 29th, as students and workers got out of their jobs and classes for the weekend. In Al-Qamishli, at least 15,000 people stood together and chanted “With our soul and with our blood we will sacrifice ourselves for Dara’a”. May saw a dramatic uptick in violence, with several other cities coming under siege. However, protesters were not dissuaded, and many thousands kept taking to the streets in cities like Homs, Hama, Dara’a, Latakia, and many more. In Dara’a, the body of a 13-year-old boy named Hamza Ali Al-Khateeb was returned to his family after a month in police captivity. The body showed signs of mutilation and torture, and his death reinvigorated protests around the country.

13-year-old Hamza Ali Al-Khateeb, who was tortured to death by police

By now at least 1,000 people had been killed around Syria, with at least a dozen cities and towns under military siege. Jisr ash-Shugur was attacked with gunships and tanks and was finally stormed on the 13th of June. Seven days later, President Assad gave a long, rambling speech, in which he blamed foreigners and outside intervention for the protests and the violence. This served to further aggravate the Syrian people, who took to the streets in greater numbers than ever before. Protests began in Damascus for the first time, and the international community began placing sanctions on Syria. In Deir ez-Zor, mass protests of over 450,000 people began taking place in late June and early July, finally culminating in a mass defection of Syrian army personnel on the 29th and the creation of the Free Syrian Army, or FSA.

Members of the Free Syrian Army in 2011. Note the helmets, intact uniforms, and clean weapons, indicating this photo was taken shortly after the soldiers pictured defected

The next major date for Syrian Kurds was 7 October 2011, when activist Mashaal al-Tammo was murdered by unknown gunmen in his home. The attack was later blamed on the government. In Al-Qamishli, tens of thousands took to the streets outside the hospital al-Tammo’s body was taken to in protest. The following day at least 14 mourners were killed in a government crackdown after around 50,000 people took to the streets of Al-Qamishli to remember al-Tammo. On January 10, 2012, president Assad gave a rambling speech in which he blamed the ongoing unrest on foreign dissidents, provocateurs, and terrorists, a line he would continue to echo for years to come.

President Bashar al-Assad giving his now-famous speech

In February the war began to take on a darker turn, with hundreds being killed by the Regime on a daily basis. In the international realm, several nations, including the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) closed or restricted their diplomatic missions to Syria. Sanctions were attempted through the United Nations Security Council (Resolutions S/2012/77 and S/2012/538), but these were vetoed by Russia and China.

Members of the UN Security Council voting on a resolution regarding Syria in late 2015

From February until June Kurdish front stayed largely quiet, with mass protests occasionally breaking out in Al-Qamishli. On 19 June the FSA called upon the Kurds to join in the fight against the Syrian government. In exchange, they promised to end “injustice” against the Kurds in a future Syria. On 19 July the border city of Kobanê was taken over without a shot fired by the Kurdish Popular Defense Committees as the SAA pulled back to cover the “heartland”. Toward the end of July, Salih Muslim, one of the co-leaders of the PYD, told the BBC that the Kurds were ready to “govern themselves”, but reiterated that he did not mean Kurdish independence; rather, he was referring to increased autonomy in a new, democratic Syria.

Salih Muslim, co-president of the PYD

Asya Abdullah, co-president of the PYD


August started with a condemnation of the Syrian government by the United Nations General Assembly. The resolution, 66/253, read, in part:


  1. Condemns the increasing use by the Syrian authorities of heavy weapons, including indiscriminate shelling from tanks and helicopters, in population centres and the failure to withdraw their troops and heavy weapons to their barracks, contrary to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 2042 (2012) and paragraph 2 of Council resolution 2043 (2012);
  2. Strongly condemns the continued widespread and systematic gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities and pro-Government militias, such as the use of force against civilians, massacres, arbitrary executions, the killing and persecution of protestors, human rights defenders and journalists, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, interference with access to medical treatment, torture, sexual violence, and ill-treatment, including against children, as well as any human rights abuses by armed opposition groups; 
  3. Condemns all violence, irrespective of where it comes from, including terrorist acts; 

Throughout the remainder of 2012 and into 2013 the Kurds in Rojava continued to consolidate power in their cities. All cities were cleared of government forces save for Al-Hasakah and Al-Qamishli, wherein the garrisons remained and controlled substantial portions of the city. On 27 October, 2012, approximately 30 people were killed in clashes between the YPG in a Kurdish neighborhood of Aleppo and unknown Arab rebels. An additional 200 people were taken prisoner by either side (total of 200).

Sheik Maqsoud, Aleppo, Syria -- Densely populated urban area with a majority-Kurdish population greater than all of Efrin Canton


On 18 January 2013, two radical jihadist groups, Ghuraba al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra (Syrian offshoot of al-Qaeda), the latter designated a terrorist group by the United States and many other nations/organizations, launched an attack on the city of Kobanê. Heavy fighting ensued, and at one point the jihadists were reinforced by three tanks that were driven in from the Turkish border. However, the YPG managed to hold the town and actually capture one of the tanks, which proved to be extremely useful in later operations.

Captured T-54/55 flying the flag of the YPG

The first major clash between YPG and Islamist forces came on 16 July, 2013, in the town of Ras al-Ayn. Since the conclusion of the Battle of Ras al-Ayn on 19 February 2013, the town had been divided between Arab and Kurdish fighters. On the 16th of July, a YPJ (Women’s Protection Units) patrol was ambushed by al-Nusra (Henceforth JaN), which had recently reinforced its positions in the city with approximately 200 more fighters. The driver was captured, but two passengers in the vehicle were able to escape. Proverbial alarm bells sounded and the YPG brought in reinforcements from the nearby town of al-Derbasiya. Clashes broke out between the YPG and JaN, and within a few hours the YPG had taken control of the local JaN headquarters. By midday on the 17th the YPG had routed JaN from the city and captured the Turkish/Syrian border crossing, but not before two Kurdish and nine JaN fighters died. Fighting continued through the 19th in the towns of Tal A’lo, Karhouk and A’li Agha. Between the 16th and the 19th at least 35 Islamist and 19 YPG fighters had been killed in the clashes.

YPG fighters seen from the Turkish side of the border

By August Daesh had announced their intention to capture the YPG headquarters city of Kobanê. The month saw continued clashes in smaller villages around Kobanê, namely between the FSA/Islamists and the YPG. At this point, JaN and Daesh were still allies. As August came to a close the YPG seemed on the retreat, with Islamist factions gaining ground in Kobanê canton. These advances, and similar advances in Aleppo, led to some Kurds fleeing toward Kobanê and Afrin. As Islamist groups, in particular Daesh, took control of these villages and towns, they began ethnically cleansing members of the Kurdish community. In the absence of heavy weapons, Daesh was able to quickly overrun YPG positions. As noted previously, Daesh has in their inventory many main battle tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, something the YPG lacked at the time (and still largely lacks).

YPJ fighters heading toward Kobanê

Finally on 13 September 2014, Daesh initiated a large-scale offensive to capture the Kobanê canton and the city of Kobanê itself. Since February Daesh had been separate from JaN, so as Daesh forces encircled Kobanê elements of the FSA joined Kurds fleeing Daesh and seeking refuge in Kobanê or Turkey itself. Heavy combat ensued, with the YPG pledging not to give up Kobanê and Daesh pledging not to halt until the town was taken. By 19 September Daesh had captured approximately 40 Kurdish villages near Kobanê and was advancing rapidly on the city itself. As Daesh closed in on at least 100 more smaller villages, the YPG began evacuating civilians to safety in Turkey despite sustained enemy artillery fire. All-told, approximately 300,000 civilians were evacuated through Kobanê in September/November 2014. Still others were left stranded at the border, unable to cross into Turkey as-per Turkish officials. Evidence of this human exodus is visible via satellite imagery, with thousands of cars seen parked in large encampments every several miles along the Turkish/Syrian border near Kobanê. The YPG swung into crisis mode, consolidating their forces in Kobanê and receiving at least 300 reinforcements via Turkey. Meanwhile Murat Karayilan, a senior PKK official in Turkey, called upon Kurdish youth in Turkey to answer the call and respond to Kobanê.

Map of the dire situation in Kobanê in October 2014

Continued in Part 4